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The concept of reflection has over the past two decades frequently 
been discussed in education and teaching. At the center of this de-
bate is, and has been since 1983 when it was first published, Donald 
A. Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in 
Action. Schön’s concept of “reflection-in-action” is pivotal in his ana-
lytical claims as well as in his theory on the reflective practitioner.  
In this thesis – Docile Bodies and Imaginary Minds – the author ana-
lyses the concept of reflection-in-action and the discursive resources 
on which it is reliant. During these analyses critical issues about thin-
king, body, mind and practice are highlighted. The author asks (i) is 
Schön’s suggestion “reflection-in-action” valid as an epistemological 
suggestion for describing and analyzing teacher practice, (ii) how can 
Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action and its use in education be 
conceived as matters of discourse? This thesis reframes Schön’s re-
flection-in-action. The author argues that the epistemological claims 
in Schön’s theory of reflection-in-action are highly problematic and 
that his theory of the reflective practitioner is to be recognized as a 
concept that is interwoven with a particular historical and political 
technique for the construction of subjectivity. 
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Abstract 
 
The modern debate on reflection in education started in the Anglo-American world at the 
beginning of the 1980s and spread from there to the Nordic countries. The focus in this 
debate has been on how professional practitioners, such as teachers and nurses, can use 
reflection in their professions. At the center of this debate is, and has been since 1983 
when it was first published, Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think 
in Action. A pivotal concept in Schön’s discussions, as well as in his theory on the reflective 
practitioner, is reflection-in-action. Schön uses this concept to explain how practitioners 
develop a certain kind of thinking – thinking incorporated in action – which enables them 
to accomplish their work.  
 
Schön’s reflection-in-action concept is the main focus of this thesis. I analyze the concept 
as well as the discursive resources on which it relies. In the introductory background 
section, I first discuss Schön in the modern reflection-field in education and teaching. I 
then proceed to consider the relevance of Dewey to an outline of Schön’s theory of the 
reflective practitioner. I complete the background section with an introductory analysis, 
where I use a Wittgenstein-influenced critique by Newman in order to discuss the 
epistemological validity of Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action.  
 
This discussion about Newman’s critique is also the point of departure for the four articles 
in section two in which I develop my main theoretical claims in this thesis. I use two kinds 
of analytical modes. In articles 1 and 2 I mainly use conceptualizations from Merleau-
Ponty whereas in articles 3 and 4 I use conceptualizations from Foucault as analytical 
resources. These two analytical modes serve the overriding purposes of my study and help 
me to answer the two main questions that structure the analytical efforts in the articles 
and in the thesis as a whole. The questions are: (i) is Schön’s suggestion “reflection-in-
action” valid as an epistemological suggestion for describing and analyzing teacher 
practice, (ii) how can Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action and its use in education be 
conceived as matters of discourse?  
 
In the first article I claim that Schön’s “reflection-in-action” involves a control-matrix 
which recognizes the “mind” as controlling and the body as obeying, a claim which, if 
valid, makes Schön’s concept highly problematic. In the second article I argue that in the 
modern reflection debate in education there has been a tendency to interpret Dewey as 
linked to Cartesian ontology, a link from which Dewey needs to be saved. In article three I 
reframe Schön’s reflection concept and claim that his theory of the reflective practitioner is 
to be recognized as a concept that is interwoven with a particular historical and political 
technique for the construction of subjectivity. In the fourth article I argue that the 
reflection theme may be viewed as a component in a discursive battle about visuality and 
light. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Even though many of the themes of the reflection debate, such as thinking, learn-
ing and doing and the successive transformation of an individual from a novice to 
an accomplished participant have been discussed in different forms for centuries in 
the West, the modern debate on reflection in education is quite easy to identify. It 
started in the Anglo-American world at the beginning of the 1980s and spread 
from there to the Nordic countries (Boud et. al 1985; Carr, & Kemmis, 1987; 
Grimmett & Erickson, 1988; Carson, Zeichner & Tabachinick, 1991; Handal and 
Lauvås, 19871; Bengtsson 1993; Alexandersson, 1994; Rolf, 1995; Molander, 1996). 
The focus in this debate has been on how professional practitioners, such as teach-
ers and nurses, can use reflection in their professions. 
 
At the center of this debate is, and has been since 1983 when it was first published, 
Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action2, in which 
Schön uses detailed examples from for instance, an architect’s studio and psycho-
therapy sessions. A pivotal concept in Schön’s discussions, as well as in his theory 
on the reflective practitioner, is reflection-in-action. By the use of this concept he 
explains how practitioners develop their skills - or as he frames it, how they develop 
a certain kind of thinking that is incorporated in action - which makes them more 
able to accomplish their work.  
 
Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action is the main focus in this thesis and forms a 
conceptual hub in the main parts of my texts. However, I also discuss other issues, 
such as for example the recognition of Dewey in the reflection debate. I discuss the 
metaphysical “material” that is in use in the construction of reflection, as well as the 
legitimizing resources that this theme in education is dependent on and transfers. I 
thereby recognize, to some extent, the socio-cultural landscape of reflection(-in-
action). 
                                                 
1 1983 in Norway 
2 From here onwards abbreviated as “The Reflective Practitioner”. 
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Purpose 
 
Already in 1991 Zeichner & Tabachinick pointed out that it is almost impossible to 
find a teacher-educator who does not emphasize the importance of reflection. As 
an illustration there are at present 12021 hits in ERIC on the search string “reflec-
tion” and the period 2000-2006 contains 3327 articles and conference papers in 
the same database.  
 
The widespread use of “reflection” as a concept of importance for the development 
of teacher professionalism coincides with the publications of Schön’s The Reflective 
Practitioner (1983) and the sequel Educating the Reflective Practitioner (1987). 
These texts are extensively referred to and have had a documented impact on edu-
cation and related fields. However, Schön’s theories have not been unchallenged. 
Fenstermacher criticizes the inconsistent use of the term “reflection” (Fenster-
macher, 1988); van Manen argues that reflection does not describe the differences 
between novice teachers and experienced teachers (van Manen, 1995) and New-
man claims that the whole epistemological account in Schön’s theories has to be 
rewritten (Newman, 1999). 
 
Moreover, although Schön’s texts are undoubtedly the most important in the re-
search field of reflection in education, there are also other resources that have been 
used in this debate. Dewey’s texts, especially How we Think (Dewey, 1960, 1997), 
have played an important role as has Aristotle’s The Nicomachean Ethics (Aris-
totle, 1955 [book six]). A consultation of the journal Reflective Practice (the first 
and only major journal dedicated solely to the research field of reflective practice) 
reveals the wide range of studies involved, including perspectives such as Marxism 
and post-modernism. Nevertheless, even these contemporary debates and discus-
sions about reflection in education and related problems often start with Schön’s 
theories and his special concept of “reflection-in-action” which currently generates 
111 000 hits in Google.3  
                                                 
3 2007-07-26 
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The most fundamental claim in Schön’s theory about reflection is that “thinking” is 
incorporated in practitioners’ doing, in their actual, situated, action. This claim is 
condensed in the concept reflection-in-action. In this thesis, however, I will argue 
(i) that the epistemological claims in Schön’s theory on reflection-in-action are 
highly problematic and (ii) that the theory of the reflective practitioner is to be rec-
ognized as a concept that is interwoven in a particular historical and political tech-
nique for the construction of subjectivity. Moreover, I will suggest that in construct-
ing the theory of reflection–in-action Schön uses cultural material that he redis-
tributes in and by his argumentation, and that in this sense the theme of reflection 
is interwoven in an idiom of transparency and discipline. These reservations about 
Schön’s concept influence the two main questions that structure the analytical ef-
forts in the articles, and in the thesis as a whole. These questions are:  
 
• (i) is Schön’s suggestion about the value of “reflection-in-action” valid as an 
epistemological suggestion for describing and analyzing the content and 
quality of teacher practice 
• (ii) how can Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action and its use in education 
be conceived as matters of discourse?4 
 
The purpose of this study is therefore to discuss and criticize not only Schön’s con-
cept of reflection-in action but also the metaphysical socio-cultural material upon 
which it is reliant. 
 
 
                                                 
4 I primarily use a Foucaultian discourse concept. Weedon points out that discourse in Fou-
cault are “ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of sub-
jectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledge and relations between them. 
Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 
‘nature’ of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they 
seek to govern” (Weedon, 1987, p 108). 
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Focus 
 
In The Reflective Practitioner Schön offers a general discussion on professional 
practitioners in society, and in relation to this he explicitly raises epistemological 
issues. But, primarily, he discusses practitioners’ practices using examples that in a 
way structure the text of The Reflective Practitioner. These examples are broad and 
well modulated. They point to the use of artifacts, and to some extent, bodily 
movement, as well as communication. However, what interests me the most is the 
textual movements that structure the relation between the general discussions and 
the examples: that is, the interpretations of the examples that Schön uses in order 
to construct his theory of reflection-in-action. I am, you might say, primarily inter-
ested in how reflection-in-action works in Schön’s exemplification of human prac-
tice.5
 
In the articles I explore some perspectives and discuss a few problems that I find 
highly relevant in relation to education and to the question of how teacher practice 
(or any practice) can be explained, understood and framed. The focus of these per-
spectives is matters of body and mind and the relation between them. 
 
 
Methodological Considerations 
 
This text is a theoretical study in the philosophy of education. In addition to a 
background section, it contains four analytical articles in which I develop my theo-
retical claims. It is primarily by the analyses in the articles that I claim to offer re-
search contributions in this thesis.  
 
I use two kinds of analytical modes in the articles. In article 1 and 2 I use conceptu-
alizations from Merleau-Ponty as main analytical tools. In articles 3 and 4 I use 
                                                 
5 I do not, however, have any exegetic or hegemonic ambitions in relation to Schön’s texts 
and conceptualizations. Other interpretations and/or analyses than the ones I present in this 
text are of course possible. 
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conceptualizations from Foucault as main analytical resources. This does not 
mean, however, that I follow either author’s methodology. I merely use some of 
their theoretical framework for my analytical purposes. The two analytical modes 
serve the overriding purposes of my study and help answering the two structuring 
questions. I try to answer the question to what extent Schön’s theory on reflection-
in-action seems valid as an epistemological suggestion with conceptualizations 
from Merleau-Ponty and how Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action can be con-
ceived as matters of discourse by using conceptualizations from Foucault. This 
methodological procedure is, however, also linked, as we shall see, to how I concep-
tualize questions concerning ontology and/or epistemology in this thesis.  
 
In the first two articles (and in the main part of the introduction) I discuss onto-
logical and epistemological issues, whereas I discuss political and power-related 
ones in articles 3 and 4. The reasons for starting with ontological and epistemologi-
cal issues are quite simple. First, many of the most influential texts in the field of 
reflection have discussed epistemological (or/and ontological) issues. Examples are 
Schön (1983, 1987, 1991), van Manen (1991, 1995) and above all, Dewey, who has 
been recognized as the main influence in the modern reflection debate in education 
(Dewey, 1997, 1998; Schön, 1983, 1987; Grimmett, 1988). Secondly, even if one 
may question ontological or epistemological projects as such (as I will discuss 
later), they have indisputably established their own particular frameworks and de-
veloped refined theoretical tools, which efficiently highlight difficulties in the area 
of knowing and claims in that area. Thirdly, beginning the discussion in the fields 
of ontology will make it more difficult to undermine the thesis as a whole (with its 
critique of Schön and part of the reflection debate) by questioning the sometimes 
controversial claims of Foucault that I use in the later part of the thesis.6  
                                                 
6 Also, by using Merleau-Ponty in this part of the discussion I point to a major conceptual 
difficulty of a Cartesian ontogenesis found in Schön’s reasoning that I call “the control ma-
trix”. This complex of problems is also fundamental in the sections where I use Foucaultian 
perspectives, even thought they are elaborated in a different way. (In “The Rise and the Fall 
of the Self” Solomon discusses the development of the continental philosophical tradition 
since 1750. Contemporary contributors in the modern debate about subjectivity are for ex-
ample Deleuze, [1990]; Butler, [1993] and Žižek, [2004].) 
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In articles 3 and 4, I press the argumentation beyond the limitations of ontology 
and epistemology and frame matters of reflection as matters of discourse. At this 
point I am then committed to the workings of reflection as a tool for subjectivation 
where reflection (reflection-in-action) is no longer an epistemological or/and onto-
logical project alone. The reason for these discussions is illustrated by an example 
Rabinow gives in his book on Foucault: 
 
Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky appeared, some years ago, on a Dutch television 
program for a debate on the topic ”Human Nature: Justice versus Power”. /…/ Start-
ing from his own research, Chomsky asked: How is it that on basis of a partial and 
fragmentary set of experiences, individuals in every culture are not only able to learn 
their own language, but to use it in a creative way? For Chomsky, there was only one 
possible answer: there must be a bio-physical structure underlying the mind which 
enables us, both as individuals and as a species, to deduce from the multiplicity of in-
dividual experiences a unified language. /…/ Michel Foucault rejects Chomsky’s view 
of both human nature and science. In methodologically typical fashion, Foucault 
avoids the abstract question: Does human nature exist?, and asks instead: How has 
the concept of human nature functioned in our society? (Rabinow, 1991, p 3). 
 
The important questions for the traditional lines of reasoning, carried on by Chom-
sky in the example above, are what the nature or character of something is, or how 
knowledge about it is possible. Foucault on the other hand focused on how the 
questions, and the categories these questions are presuming and are derived from, 
function as frameworks for reasoning about and organizing of institutional prac-
tices as well as how these questions constitute legitimizing resources. While the 
traditional lines of reasoning have been devoted to describing the order of things, 
Foucault is committed to analyzing how things are ordered by political, historical, 
lingual and socio-culture conditions.7  
                                                 
7 The term “traditional” that I use here is a simplification. By using this term, I do not ac-
knowledge many and vital differences between alternative lines of reasoning. Different phi-
losophical traditions such as phenomenology and analytical philosophy appear to “stand on 
the same” side so to speak. Of course, this is unfair to both these highly sophisticated sys-
tems of thought. My point is not to diminish the importance of these traditions, nor the ut-
terly complex discussions that these traditions have been engaged in over the years. The 
18
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Foucault’s direction has made it possible to investigate questions from a different 
perspective (even though Foucault is indebted to Nietzsche [Nietzsche, 1996, 1999; 
Mahon, 1992], to Marxism [Olsson, 2004] and psychoanalysis). His perspective 
makes it obvious that questions frame an issue socially, politically and historically, 
by making some answers possible and others not. An illuminating example is 
found in discussions on gender (Butler, 1993) and questions of homosexuality. In a 
“traditional” way of discussing, it is a legitimate question to ask “is homosexuality 
natural or not”? This implies that it is possible to recognize sexual behavior in 
terms of “natural” and “un-natural” or “more” or “less” natural. The possible an-
swers to the question are actually “yes” or “no”, or possibly something in between: 
i.e. that it can be argued to be natural or unnatural given certain conditions.  
 
However, from Foucault’s perspective the question of whether homosexuality is 
natural or not is itself an example of a discursive practice, and the urgent questions 
should instead probably be formulated as “under what social and historical condi-
tions is it legitimate (or “natural”) to ask if homosexuality is natural or not”? Alter-
natively, “what does this question do and what has it done in our society”? i.e. 
“what social practices, what institutional activities, what organizations of society 
does this question contribute to legitimate and distribute?8 Foucault’s shift there-
fore reframes questions of ontology and epistemology as questions of politics, 
power and social-cultural conditions. 
                                                                                                                                         
discussion here is pedagogical and communicative. Like Rabinow, I am making a point. I am 
illustrating the fundamental turn of Foucault that I use in the later part of this text (for a 
parallel discussion see Tylor [1991]). 
8 The question, “is homosexuality is natural or not?”, frames a certain kind of sexual behav-
ior in a certain way and it has legitimatized social practices that over millennia have ex-
cluded, demonized, and pathologized not only homosexuality but also a wide variety of dif-
ferent kinds of sexual behavior. A discussion similar to this is presented in Foucault’s The 
Use of Pleasure. While Christianity began to discuss whether a sexual behavior is natural or 
non-natural (and successively in terms of good and bad) the Greeks discussed which kind of 
behavior that is preferable for the practitioner in terms of quantity, before or after taking a 
meal and so on (Foucault, 2000). 
19
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The implication of my discussion so far is not that I claim that one should not (or 
cannot, or is not allowed to) participate in discussions that include matters of on-
tology and epistemology. Nor do I mean to suggest that questions of ontology 
or/and epistemology are invalid. (That would actually be a strange claim since I am 
committed to such discussions in this text.) On the contrary, dealing with these 
matters can be both urgent and rewarding. The point is that they are not by neces-
sity the most urgent ones and that the categories of “ontology” and “epistemology” 
are not given by nature. They represent one way of asking questions and of fram-
ing an issue. Therefore, when I discuss epistemology and ontology in this thesis, I 
fully recognize that this is only one way of dealing with the matters of reflection, 
and that there are other equally potent and valid ways. But, I do claim that it is ur-
gent not to let categories such as “ontology” and “epistemology” have sole authority 
in discussions.  
 
 
The Rationale of Part I 
 
I devote this introductory part to some necessary groundwork for my analytical 
claims and main scientific contribution in the articles in part II. After my general 
discussion, I turn to discussing Schön in the modern reflection-field in education 
and teaching. I then proceed to consider Dewey, who without any doubt is the sin-
gle most influential theorist for the modern debate on reflection. Since Schön him-
self acknowledged Dewey’s texts as fundamental for his own writing (Schön, 1992), 
a brief account of Dewey’s reflection concept provides a useful background to my 
discussion on Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action, and its metaphysical sur-
roundings. After that I outline Schön’s theory of the reflective practitioner (1983) to 
be ready for my first analytical encounter with Schön’s theory of reflection-in-
action. In this introductory analysis, I use Wittgenstein, and especially Newman’s 
use of Wittgenstein (1997) 9 in his epistemological critique of Schön’s concept of 
reflection-in-action (1999), a critique in which Newman detects and illustrates a 
                                                 
9 originally published in 1953 
20
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critical (Cartesian) conceptual structure in Schön’s reasoning. This is also where 
the analyses in the articles start.  
 
 
21
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SCHÖN AND THE MODERN REFLECTION  
DISCUSSIONS IN EDUCATION 
 
When The Reflective Practitioner was published in 1983, it became almost in-
stantly influential in teacher education especially in North America. Already in 
1988 Grimmett and Ericksson published an anthology of the debates on Schön’s 
book discussing, among other topics, the relevance of Schön’s models for teachers 
(Gilliss, 1988), issues of epistemology in education in relation to Schön’s concep-
tions of reflective practice (Fenstermacher, 1988) and the conceptual problems and 
its relation to practice in teaching and teacher-education (Hills & Gibson, 1988; 
Schulman, 1988). This anthology was an early acknowledgement of the tremen-
dous importance of Schön’s text. The reflection theme in education continued to 
grow and in 2000 Reflective Practice (Routledge) became the first international 
journal dedicated to reflection and reflective practice.  
 
However, even if this research field has been dominated by Schön’s theories, and of 
discussions and critique of them, and of Dewey’s theories that Schön was inspired 
by, there have also been competing theories. An important example of this is Han-
dal and Lauvås Promoting Reflective Teaching - Supervision in Practice (1987)10. 
Their theme is that experience and reflection can promote better supervision, and 
in contrast to Schön they present reflection as a tool to be used after or/and before 
practice and not while doing the actual classroom work. 
 
Another example on an early influential theory of reflection, before Schön’s theory 
more or less took over, is Boud’s, Keogh’s and Walker’s anthology Reflection: 
Turning Experience into Learning (1985). The main question in their book is 
“What is it that turns experience into learning?” (1985, p 7). The key answer is that 
experience alone does not bring about learning. It is reflection that turns experi-
ence into learning (1985, pp 8-9). They trace reflection back to Aristotle (1988) but 
argue that in modern times it is Dewey who has had most influence, particularly 
                                                 
10 Originally published in Norwegian in 1983. 
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How We Think (Dewey, 199711). It is, however, interesting to notice that in the in-
troduction, the authors point out that a text of great importance for the discussion 
on reflection and practice has come to their attention too late too be considered in 
their discussion, namely Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner (1983).  
 
The extensive use of reflection in education has of course also suggested different 
uses within an educational framework. McIntyre (1993) for example argues that 
there is confusion between reflection as an aim and reflections as a means. He 
points out that reflection can be a means to ensure that teacher students reflect in 
an adequate way during their practice, and that it can be an aim to have student 
teachers reflect in an adequate way in order to achieve certain aims during their 
practice (McIntyre, 1993). Zeichner & Tabachinick (1991) discuss how different 
traditions or lines of reasoning have given rise to different versions of reflection in 
teaching. In a somewhat different way, Grimmett and Erickson 1988 have tried 
categorize how reflection has been was used in teaching, teacher-education and 
related fields by analyzing and describing different ways in which reflection has 
been applied in the literature on teacher-education (Clift, Houston & Pugach, 
1990). However, even if these well-known studies have tried to go beyond Schön’s 
ways to discussing reflection, they both start with the publication of Schön’s The 
Reflective Practitioner and the enormous impact this text has had since then. Re-
flection became after Schön’s text was published a key component in the episte-
mology of professionals’ practice. Reflection was supposed to be a part of the prac-
tice-oriented thinking that professional practitioners successively develop.  
 
Ziechner is one of the researchers who have had an impact on this field of research 
(Ziechner, 1982, 1987, 1991). With Schön’s texts as part of his theoretical founda-
tion, Ziechner  has over many years developed action-research and has helped to 
build a teacher training program with reflection as one of the leading themes at the 
University of Wisconsin. One might say that Zeichner has tried to implement 
Schön’s theories in practice. 
 
                                                 
11 Different versions of How We Think were published in 1911 and 1933. 
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The most well-known writer in the reflection debate in education and teaching, 
after Schön, is probably van Max van Manen, (1977, 1991, 1995). Van Manen has, 
from a phenomenological position, pointed out some difficulties in Schön’s theo-
ries, and especially in Schön’s discussion of reflection-in-action. In for example “On 
the Epistemology of Reflective Practice” (1995) van Manen discusses the temporal 
possibilities of reflection in teaching practice (and points out a problem that I am 
going to attend to later on in this thesis). Classroom work presupposes action over 
which there is no time to reflect, van Manen argues. Theoretical knowledge, knowl-
edge of a special subject and teaching skills are not directly applicable in the actual 
classroom of chaos, contemporariness and unpredictability. Other forms of skill-
fulness are acquired to master these situations. “Pedagogical tact” is the term that 
van Manen suggests to describe this practical and experience-based competence 
that he recognizes as a third epistemological position; a position between theory 
and practice, between thinking and action (van Manen, 1991, 1995).  
 
However, aside from the Schön-influenced contributions to discussions about 
practitioner knowledge during the last decade, postmodern and postcolonial criti-
cism also extended their reach into this area of research. This is apparent in the 
journal Reflective Practice. In this journal, articles that discuss metaphors, writing 
as practice and subject positions from what could broadly be called post-modern 
standpoints, share space with practice-oriented and Schönian influenced texts. 
Kalmbach Phillips (2002) for example uses Foucault and Butler to analyze her own 
analyses of her reading of teacher essays. Beach presents critical/Marxist perspec-
tives and discusses the organization of society within the framework of reflective 
practice (Beach, 2005). Bleakley (2000) and Cavallaro Johnsson (2002) explore 
post-personal positions that recognize practice and the practicing subject as lin-
guistic phenomena organized by and through narratives. The consequences of 
Bleakley (2000) and Cavallaro Johnsson (2002) perspectives are that my “I”, my 
practice and the narratives about myself and my practice limit the possibilities of 
my practice and offer at the same time the resources for change. These views on the 
self offer quite a contrast to the rather un- problematized subject that Schön uses as 
an organizing fundament for the examples around which his texts are structured.  
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Yet, even if the variety of approaches in this field is vast and the suggestions of what 
reflection is about are many, Schön and the discussions that have followed since 
the publication of his texts (1983, 1987) still dominate the field of reflection. One 
could argue that reflection as a research field (and especially as a field of research in 
education and teaching) has to a large degree been a consequence of Schön’s theo-
ries and the impact they have had. Schön’s texts and especially his concept of re-
flection-in-action are therefore central to understanding reflection in education 
and problems that are specific to this field.  
25
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DEWEY AND REFLECTION 
 
The background for the reflection-discussions and for the special concept of reflec-
tion-in-action developed by Schön is found in Dewey’s writings. Grimmett writes in 
an early anthology on reflection in teaching and teacher education:  
 
His [John Dewey’s] influence has been so pervasive (particularly on Schön himself) 
that no understanding of research in this genre [reflection] is possible without first ac-
knowledging the common properties enunciated so long by this intellectual giant.” 
(Grimmett & Erickson, 1988, p 6) 
 
When discussing reflection in education more thoroughly, Dewey’s concept of re-
flection is therefore the right place to start. One could claim that the concept of re-
flection, in the mainstream reflection debate, in important matters actually takes 
quite a different turn than Dewey’s reasoning does, by not recognizing the prag-
matic framework of Dewey and therefore, as discussed later in this text, actually 
making intellectualistic claims on Dewey’s behalf. Nonetheless, the concept of re-
flection developed by Dewey can still be seen to be the main historical influence on 
this discussion.  
 
 
The Primacy of Practice 
 
Dewey criticizes classical epistemology. He focuses on function and practice. His 
turn is illustrated in a famous discussion he had with Russell. Burke comments on 
this discussion as follows: 
 
The empirical character of inquiry /…/ is what Dewey is calling attention to when he 
talks about ”the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of proposi-
tions, provided these consequences are operationally instituted and are such as to re-
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solve the specific problem evoking the operations” (Dewey, 1938, p iv) – a point 
which Russell /…/ did not see as having any relevance to logic (Burke, 1994, p 137).12
 
The contrast between Dewey’s pragmatism and “spectator knowledge” is vital. The 
dominating Western order of thought and lines of reasoning recognized, on the one 
hand, an already organized world, and on the other hand, a subject that registers 
this world. Knowledge was the effect of vision. In contrast, Dewey recognized lan-
guage, technology, the use of tools, thinking, doing - and the cultural, social and 
political institutions that at the same time offer resources for action and limit these 
actions - as irreducible, historical and temporal categories, that function as a basis 
for the complex notion of knowledge. In Dewey’s reasoning, it is by action and in 
action, that knowledge is gained and modified. Knowledge is a consequence of ac-
tion-relations in specific social, linguistic, instrumental and institutional situations, 
where knowledge is already embedded and in use. Dewey altered the idiom of con-
ceptualized knowledge and its functions: passivity was changed to activity and the 
search for eternal, universal truths to a continuing struggle for resources. Action, its 
effects and surroundings are in focus and “pure thinking” and its idiomatic prefer-
ences are abandoned. Action is the aim for knowledge, learning and thinking.  
 
The need of thinking to accomplish something beyond thinking is more potent than 
thinking for its own sake. All people at the outset, and the majority of people probably 
all their lives, attain ordering of thought through ordering of action (Dewey, 1997, p 
41). 
 
Thinking is a tool for action and a by-product of action. On his view, thinking is 
structured by action and is modified through action. 
                                                 
12 A point similar (but not identical) to Dewey’s is elaborated by Hacking about weapons 
research in The Social Construction of What, (2000) where he uses Foucaultian well as 
pragmatist perspectives in an analytical philosophical mode. One of the examples Hacking 
takes is the speed of light. He argues that the speed of light is only “objective” given certain 
physical conceptualizations, given certain instruments, given certain institutional opera-
tions, given certain knowledge on how to operate those instruments and how to interpret 
their results. Or differently put, “the speed of light” is only objective given knowledge about 
how “the speed of light” is measured. 
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Sociality, Tools and Action 
 
The landscape of Dewey’s reasoning also signifies a de-individualization. In rela-
tion to spectator knowledge, the epistemologically relevant subject in Dewey’s writ-
ings changed from the individual on her own to the individual as part of a collec-
tive. Questions concerning communication, artifact use, institutions and politics, 
become relevant. The artifacts and the culture with which they are interwoven, and 
through which they are legitimated, produce procedures for thinking i.e. linguistic, 
social and cultural rules that individuals are subject to but also use as resources for 
action. To think “right” is to learn to handle problems in a socially accepted and for 
the relevant culture acknowledged way. 
 
The historical, socio-cultural character of “thinking tools” is elaborated already in 
How We Think: “The child today soon regards constituent parts of object qualities 
that once required the intelligence of a Copernicus or a Newton to apprehend” 
(Dewey, 1997, p 18). In the West today it is “common sense” that the earth is a 
globe. It is not something we need to think about and we do not have to defend this 
belief. In the same way we can use the concept of “atom” without explaining it, 
which would have been impossible to do just a hundred years ago. On the other 
hand, it is highly unfamiliar to most of us to reflect on how original sin has affected 
us, something many people did in the Middle Ages. Problems at hand and the pos-
sible solutions available are partly (and mainly) a question of the culture which 
offers the artifacts (and thereby the language) to recognize and frame a problem as 
such, and also what counts as a solution to the problem. If an illness affects us we 
go to a physician, whereas to visit a priest is not the first thing that comes to mind. 
We are situated by a world, by certain beliefs, by certain “everday” knowledge and 
certain “reasonable” ways of action. 
 
In this historical, political and socio-cultural production of knowledge, language 
plays an important part. Tiles discusses Dewey’s reasoning on language and argues 
that Dewey recognizes language first of all not just as a tool, but as ”the tool of 
tools” (Tiles, 1988, p 98). Through language-use, the individual learns to handle 
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the world and herself. Tiles points out that this external character of thinking and 
problem solving and its dependency on language as the tool of tools, also brings 
Dewey close to Wittgenstein. ”Wittgenstein wrote of ‘agreement in use’, Dewey 
wrote of ‘agreement in action’”(Tiles, 1988, p 98). Institutions, architecture and 
technology, can from his perspective, I argue, be recognized as agreements in ac-
tion brought to a social and cultural “closure”; i.e. as lingual-material (discursive) 
manifestations of a socio-culture. “To fail to understand is to fail to come into 
agreement in action; to misunderstand is to set up action at cross purposes” (Tiles, 
1988, p 98).13  
 
Dewey’s discussions about the differences between superstition and sciences may 
help to explain the above positions. In systems of superstition, incorrect statements 
may support each other within the system as individuals learn to handle the world 
in a consistent but incorrect way. Science has solved this problem, Dewey claims. 
Western societies have more (and better) knowledge about nature then they had a 
thousand years ago. The ability to distribute, use, construct and transform nature is 
proof of that. Science has procedures to acknowledge correct reasoning, correct 
observations, correct use of artifacts, correct conclusions.  
 
For all anybody can tell in advance, the spilling of salt is as likely to import bad luck as 
the bite of a mosquito to import malaria. Only systematic regulation of the conditions 
under which observations are made under and severe discipline of the habits of enter-
taining suggestions can secure a decision that one type of belief is vicious and the 
other sound. The substitution of scientific for superstitious habits of inference has not 
been brought about by any improvement in the acuteness of the senses or in the 
natural workings of the functions of suggestion. It is the result of the conditions under 
which observation and inference take place (Dewey, 1997, p 21). 
 
                                                 
13 Tiles uses a quotation from Dewey’s Logic (Dewey, 1998): “the convention or common 
consent, which steps (speech) apart as a means of recording and communicating meaning is 
that of agreement in action; of shared modes of responsive behavior and participation in 
their consequences/…/ Agreement in the proposition arrived at is significant only through 
this function in promoting in action” (Dewey quoted in Tiles, 1988, p 98). 
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The factors that regulate the thinking of the individual in Dewey’s reasoning are 
found in socio-cultural resources, in language-use and in action. But, at the same 
time, a cultures artifacts and its technology, are involved in the individual 
“abilities”, in the thinking of the individual.14 This is, roughly speaking, the 
framework that Dewey uses to develop what he labels “reflective thinking”, which is 
therefore to be considered as a specific thinking technique, a tool by which the in-
dividual gains access to the intellectual properties of a culture and by which she can 
solve problems at hand.  
 
 
Reflection as a Thinking Technique 
 
A vital issue in the practical realization of reflection is the use of what Dewey labels 
“data”. This could in a broad sense be referred to as “empirical facts” (Dewey, 
1997). Reflection constitutes a reinvestigation of data; i.e. a process during which 
one systematically formulates hypotheses and abandons or accepts them. To reflect 
is to use a concrete-problem solving strategy that Dewey claims people need for 
action. However, not all the strategies that people use to deal with a problematic 
situation qualify as “reflection”. Dewey writes:  
 
When a situation arises containing a difficulty or perplexity, the person who finds 
himself in it may take one of a number of courses. He may dodge it, dropping the ac-
tivity that brought it about, turning to something else. He may indulge in a flight of 
fancy, imagining himself powerful and wealthy, or in some other way in possessions 
of means that would enable him to deal with the difficulty. Or, finally, he faces the 
situation. In this case he begins to reflect (Dewey, 1960, p 101). 
 
                                                 
14 Similar perspectives are brought forward by for example Bruner (1987), Cole, (1998), 
Wertsch (1995) and Säljö (2000). 
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With pragmatic theory as a framework Dewey establishes in How We Think 
(1997), “reflection” 15 as a distinct order of thinking that (i) is systematic (ii) is 
aimed at gaining knowledge (iii) is critical and (iv) leads to action (1997). Thus: 
(i) ”In its loosest sense, thinking signifies everything that, as we say, is ‘in our heads’ 
or ‘goes through our minds’” (Dewey, 1997, p 2). But, reflection is not only sequen-
tiality, it is also consequence. It takes a special order where the following step in the 
process of reasoning ”leans back on its predecessors” (Dewey, 1997, p 3).16
(ii) All thinking that fulfills the requirements of being consequential is not reflec-
tion. A child may for example tell a coherent story without claiming to gain or pro-
duce knowledge. Reflective thinking is aimed at knowledge. 
(iii) Thinking can rest upon two forms of belief, Dewey argues: beliefs that are ac-
cepted even if the foundation for them has not been examined or beliefs that are 
accepted as a consequence of an examination of their foundation. Reflective think-
ing is of the second kind. 
(iv) Reflective thinking influences action.  
 
To think of whales and camels in the cloud is to entertain ourselves with fancies, ter-
minable at our pleasure, which do not lead to any belief in particular. /…/ Beliefs in 
the world’s flatness commits him who holds it to thinking in certain specific ways of 
other objects, such as the heavenly bodies, antipodes, the possibility of navigation. It 
prescribes to him actions in accordance with his conception of these objects (Dewey, 
1997, p 5). 
 
Thus, networks of institutions, traditions and artifacts precede the individual and 
offer tools for thinking and action. The potential “problem-solving ability” is lin-
guistically, instrumentally, institutionally and historically framed. Reflection is the 
action-related activity that requires the individual’s effort in order to set the avail-
able resources in motion. The development of reflective thinking is, according to 
Dewey, a development of the individual’s possibilities to use the available resources 
in a preferable way. 
                                                 
15 Dewey does not make clear distinctions between ”reflection”, ”reflective thinking”, and 
”inquiry”. 
16 “The stream or flow becomes a train, chain, or thread” (Dewey, 1997, p 3). 
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SCHÖN’S THEORY  
OF THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER 
 
Early in his career Schön was interested in the competence of professionals, an is-
sue that later resulted in his most influential text The Reflective Practitioner. As 
Newman points out, Schön already in his doctoral thesis Rationality in the Practi-
cal Decision-Process (Schön, 1954 in Newman, 1999 p 5) discusses themes in that 
he later developed more fully. These concepts include practitioner rationality, the 
connection between practice and theory, and the criticism of what Schön calls 
“technical rationality”, which he claims does not sufficiently answer the demands of 
practice. Following the same line, Schön argues in 1983 that the (at that time) new 
technology constitutes other demands and new ways of reasoning than sanctioned 
by the idiom of “technical rationality”. There is a need for a different way of recog-
nizing practitioner knowledge and its production, in Schön’s opinion (1983). 
 
 
Practice and Technical Rationality 
 
The theoretical influences on The Reflective Practitioner (1983) and on its sequel 
Educating the Reflective Practitioner (1987) are mainly found in Dewey (Dewey, 
1997; 1998). Schön discusses this explicitly in an essay from 1992, The Theory of 
Inquiry: Dewey’s Legacy to Education. Schön here writes that he recognizes The 
Reflective Practitioner as his own Logic (Dewey, 1998)17, that is, as an epistemo-
logical discussion similar to Dewey’s, and he points out that he himself did not ap-
preciate Dewey to start with due to the “muddiness” of his work, but that he grew 
to re-evaluate Dewey’s texts and came to view this muddiness as generative: 
 
When I was a graduate student at Harvard in the 1950s, my friend, Chester, urged me 
to read Dewey. But when I tried to do so, I found him muddy, and unintelligible. Later 
on  /…/ I saw that Dewey’s was a generative muddiness: he was trying to say new 
                                                 
17 originally published in 1938 
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things that were bound to seem muddy to anyone trained as I had been in the logical 
empiricism fashionable at the time (Schön, 1992, p 123). 
 
This comment points to a deliberate attempt to continue in the same tradition as 
Dewey, but, at the same time, it can still be seen as a defense for the heavy critique 
aimed at the conceptual weaknesses in The Reflective Practitioner which had been, 
by then, delivered by numerous researchers and philosophers in the field of educa-
tion. Even so, it is also a general argument supporting his own method. In the same 
way as Dewey (1997, 1998), Schön tries to work his way out of the dominant tradi-
tions at the time and to invent new ways of acknowledging practitioner knowing 
and skillfulness.  
 
Schön’s text The Reflective Practitioner is structured by examples, or actually case 
reports, that require considerable space in the book. These examples have been 
referred to and used in several discussions in the debate on reflection in education 
and teaching. The most commonly used example - even by Schön himself who re-
capitulated it in Educating the Reflective Practitioner - is about the architect stu-
dent Petra and the architect teacher Quist.  
 
Schön’s descriptions of how Petra and Quist handle problems and tools and how 
they discuss different solutions to problems are extensive and empirically interest-
ing. Schön describes how Petra successively appropriates an ability to solve archi-
tectural problems and how she develops a convergence of meaning with Quist, 
that is to say, mutual understanding of how architect problems should be solved. 
An important contribution is that Schön recognizes that the communication be-
tween Petra and Quist involves drawings, the use of tools and that it is therefore 
hardly meaningful to analyze only the spoken words when discussing the interac-
tion between them.  
 
The theoretical issues that Schön discusses in The Reflective Practitioner are ex-
tensive and complex. A number of different subjects are involved and many ques-
tions are left unanswered. Questions of tacit knowledge are brought forward, such 
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as what is intended by “tacit knowledge” and how this subject can be meaningfully 
discussed or debated? But also questions about learning are accentuated, such as, 
from what theoretical perspective are Schön’s examples interesting and adequate 
and how should they be understood? Is it possible to draw theoretical conclusions 
from them that induce implications for other situations and institutional circum-
stances than the ones they are framed by and express? What view of language, cul-
ture and artifact use, of human interaction, communication and habitual forms are 
presupposed and excluded, given how Schön’s examples are analyzed, interpreted 
and explained? 
 
It is in this vortex of potential problems that “reflection” in Schön’s text has a syn-
thesizing function. Newman claims that reflection (reflection-in-action) is a con-
cept that rather hides problems than explains them. Newman’s objection is valid. 
Schön’s use of the concept of reflection is far from stringent and uniform. But, on 
the other hand, the conceptual “muddiness” in Schön’s text has probably contrib-
uted to the tremendous circulation of the text and its importance for research on 
teaching and other practice-related fields over the past twenty years. “Reflection” 
has been useful in different discussions, on different topics and on different occa-
sions.  
 
 
The Professional Practitioner’s Reflection 
 
In The Reflective Practitioner Schön starts with what he sees as a crisis of the pro-
fessional in American society at the time and in order to develop new ways of dis-
cussing professionalism. It is, Schön argues, no longer self-evident that specialists 
and professionals should have the power to define their own fields of practice. The 
inability to acknowledge the social and ethical issues involved in professional work 
has given the concept of the “professional” a bad reputation.  
 
The major reason is, Schön claims, that “professionalism” has been linked to “tech-
nical rationality” and positivism. This dominant idiom recognizes practitioners’ 
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knowledge as something that is based on theory: i.e. the practitioner is expected to 
acquire a certain set of predetermined tools to be applied on practice-related prob-
lems. Professions that cannot be derived from a theoretical system, for example 
social work, nursing and teaching, have therefore been seen as having less of a pro-
fessional status.  
 
Schön claims, however, that architects and therapists use tacit knowledge in their 
work. This is knowledge that for different reasons has never been verbalized (and 
maybe is impossible to verbalize) and has therefore not been taught at universities. 
It is a situated knowledge that is only accessible when work is actually being carried 
out. This “knowing-in-action” is a foundation for the action-related attitude that 
the experienced practitioner has and that Schön calls “reflection-in-action”.  
 
“Reflection-in-action” is a central concept in The Reflective Practitioner, and Schön 
tries to develop a new epistemology around it. Reflection-in-action means that 
practitioners reflect on professional action at the same time as they effectuate this 
action, and it differs therefore from reflection-on-action, which signifies reflection 
on practices before or after the actual action. Schön claims that the work of archi-
tects, therapists and teachers (1983; 1987) is characterized by unique situations 
that demand special professional frame-making in order to create patterns of prob-
lems before it is possible to solve them. These professions demand a complex 
thinking that is not technical-rational, but rather based on experience. This is, 
broadly speaking, what Schön terms “reflection-in-action”.  
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IDENTIFYING THE CONTROL-MATRIX 
 
The major critique of Schön’s The Reflective Practitioner (1983) and Educating the 
Reflective Practitioner (1987) has targeted the concept-use in the texts (Grimmett, 
1988; Shulman, 1988; Fenstermacher, 1988; Gilliss, 1988; Hills & Gibson, 1988). 
This is also the line that I am going to follow, but in a different way. The problem I 
concentrate on is what could broadly be recognized as the problem of the body in 
relation to Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action. The article by van Manen’s re-
ferred to above On the Epistemology of Reflective Practice (van Manen, 1995), 
gives a good introduction to where I begin the discussion. 
 
Van Manen’s starting point in this article is the temporal possibilities of reflection 
concerning teaching practice. He claims that it is not possible to reflect during 
teaching, while Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action seems to indicate that it is.18 
Van Manen’s reasoning points to a central problem in Schön’s theory, which I here 
call “the control matrix” problem.  
 
 
The Control Matrix 
 
The control-matrix is of Cartesian ontogenesis, but can be traced back to Plato. I 
use the term “the control-matrix” to recognize the stipulation that the internal (the 
soul or the mind) controls the external (the body). This term, however, summarizes 
different themes that link networks of theories and critiques by family resem-
blance. The problems involved are many and a multitude of questions can be asked 
                                                 
18 Van Manen’s reasoning is not self-evident. An important objection is that it is not obvious 
that he is discussing an epistemological issue at all, but rather how teaching practice is 
structured and while doing this, argues that Schön’s theory is not useful in this practice 
(1995). However, he cannot claim that Schön is principally wrong, only that there is a mis-
match between the position he himself sketches by using examples and Schön’s theoretical 
claims. But, even if he does not develop an efficient theoretical critique on it, he has found a 
problematic issue in Schön’s reasoning. 
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in relation to the themes. Relevant issues are, for example: (i) the distinction be-
tween the “automatic” body and the controlling mind (ii) the relation between 
wanting something and doing something (iii) the distinctions/ relations between 
“consciousness”, “thinking” and “control” (iv) the relevance of language for control-
ling, mind and body. However, in this thesis I am not primarily committed to a 
general discussion. I focus on issues in Schön’s theory that are relevant to the re-
flection discussion in education and teaching. 
 
Newman argues that one of the major weaknesses in Schön’s epistemological 
claims is that they are interwoven with problems of control (1999, p 122). In Edu-
cating the Reflective Practitioner (1999), Schön illustrates his concept of reflection-
in-action with an example of a mother with her baby. Schön writes: 
 
Consider a mother who sits facing her baby, clapping her hands. The baby begins to 
clap too, mimicking its mother. The mother begins to clap at a faster pace; the baby 
responds by clapping faster as well. The mother claps slowly again, this time beating 
out a steady rhythm. The baby does likewise. The mother speeds up the beat and 
makes the rhythm more complicated. The baby responds by producing a lot of little, 
fast claps. The mother begins to play pat-a-cake with the baby, first extending her two 
palms to touch the baby’s two palms, then touching the baby’s right palm with her 
right, the baby’s left palm with her left. Confused at first, the baby soon responds by 
extending right hand to meet mother’s right hand, left hand to meet her left observed 
(Schön, 1987, p 108). 
 
Schön comments on this in the following way: 
 
Even so “simple” an example shows extraordinary complexity. The baby does as it has 
seen its mother do, reproducing her global gestures. But in order to do so, it must be 
able to produce control, from internal clues of feeling, what it apprehends through 
visual observation of external cues. Somehow, it manages to coordinate inner and 
outer cues to produce actions that conform, in some essential respect, to actions ob-
served (Schön, 1987, p 108). 
 
Schön argues that the baby has to have (or has to “produce”) control, and that this 
control is in fact the baby’s “reflection-in-action”. ”We can see that the mother, and 
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Schön, take the baby’s behavior as a meaningful performance of some internal in-
tention (reflection)”, Newman argues (1999, p 122). A state of “convergence of 
meaning” between the mother and baby is reached. Newman is critical: 
 
The implication of Schön’s thesis is that the baby, in order to mimic its mother and so 
in Schönian terms achieve convergence of meaning, must already have a language 
where it can take its perceptions of its mother and in a ‘constructive process’ privately 
translate them into its own performance (Newman, 1999, p 122). 
 
Newman’s point is that to be able to control its behavior, the baby has to have a 
language, on the basis of which it can interpret the mother’s behavior and, as a 
result of an intelligent calculation, effectuate its own. The baby and the mother at-
tain “convergence of meaning” by reflecting on their behavior, which is thus a con-
sequence of their inner control and therefore their “internal” (“private”) languages 
(Newman, 1999, pp 99-111). In this, however, Schön’s thesis is thematically both 
involved with and contradicted by Wittgenstein’s ”private-language discussion” 
(Newman, 1999; Wittgenstein, 1997). Wittgenstein’s analyses of language in Phi-
losophical Investigations are, of course, complex. Nonetheless, Newman offers a 
standard interpretation with the following features: 
 
(i) Linguistic expressions do not get their meaning by referring to things in the 
world directly. Meaning is a consequence of participation in language activities. In 
a well-known example, Wittgenstein writes: 
 
Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look 
into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at 
his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different 
in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose 
the word ‘beetle’ had a use in these people’s language? – If so it would not be used as 
the name of the thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; 
not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. -  No, one can ‘divide 
through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we con-
strue the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘objects and desig-
nation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant (Wittgenstein, 1997, § 293, 
100e). 
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(ii) The use of language implies the use of rules. As long as the rules are followed, 
the communication works.  Some clarifications are necessary though. First, you do 
not learn language by learning rules, you learn rules by learning language through 
practice. Second, the point is not that you therefore learn to formulate rules or 
learn to “think” about them, but that you learn to use them. Third, to know a rule is 
to be able to follow that rule, but also to know when to bend (and eventually disre-
gard) the rule.  
 
(iii) Language is something you learn from the “outside - in”. By participating in a 
language game you successively learn to use language within this particular lan-
guage-game. You learn to understand the rules of that language game. So, what 
does “understand” mean in this case? Well, the question is probably not an accu-
rate one. A more suitable question is “how do you know that someone understands 
something”. The answer is that if someone is able to participate in a language game 
(in accordance with practice), then she understands it.19
 
(iv) Since language is acknowledged as something that you participate in as an ac-
tivity of practice, language is also primarily something “external” to the individual. 
Language, that is, belongs to a practice and certain activities in that practice. This 
means that language is not (nor can it be) private. Wittgenstein points out that you 
would probably not even yourself be able to know what you meant if you used a 
private language.20 One could ask, what would a practice look like in a place where 
one established a private language? 
 
Taking his point of departure in Wittgenstein’s discussions, Newman argues that 
the baby mimicking its mother in Schön’s example is not an effect of reflection-in-
                                                 
19 The point is not that language and thinking are identical, but that during thinking (as in 
subsume under a category) language is necessary.  
20 An alternative interpretation is that Wittgenstein’s point is that you cannot legitimize 
whether you follow the rules or not, nor that you cannot follow the rules. This interpretation 
also has implications for how the problem of private language is to be recognized. It is also 
possible that this interpretation could undermine Newman’s interpretation of Schön’s re-
flection-in-action, concerning the private-language argument. 
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action, but an effect of a new communicative behavior. The baby learns new com-
municative skills by participating in a specific practice together with its mother. 
Participation implies learning a new behavior.21 Schön’s claim that the baby needs 
reflection-in-action to be able to control and effectuate its behavior is wrong, ac-
cording to Newman.  
 
Using Wittgenstein to criticize Schön, Newman’s argumentation consists, roughly 
speaking, of three primary statements: (i) Schön’s theory of reflection-in-action 
implies an “inner control” (an internal regulation of action); (ii) this control pre-
sumes a private language; (iii) Wittgenstein’s argumentation against private lan-
guages is convincing. Consequently, for Newman, Schön is wrong. What could be 
characterized as problematic in this argumentation is the claim that it necessarily 
follows that the internal control also implies internal language. 
 
Newman’s argumentation seems valid for the following reason. If the baby “has 
control” this implies that the baby has a structural and conscious possibility to in-
terpret the mother’s handclaps and by some sort of “thinking-operation” under-
stands how to produce a similar behavior. A linguistic system in a broader sense (a 
communicative and behavior system of signs) seems to be presupposed. But, since 
the baby does not have access to “common” languages, she then has to have some 
sort of pre-language, a private-language. Schön therefore seems to contradict Witt-
genstein, which, assuming Wittgenstein is correct, reveals a major weakness in his 
reasoning.  
 
This problem becomes, as Newman illustrates, particularly critical in Schön’s for-
mulation of the concept convergence of meaning (Schön, 1983, 1986). In the well-
known example from The Reflective Practitioner (1983) and re-used in Educating 
the Reflective Practitioner, presented earlier, Schön describes the architect-
virtuoso Quist and his student Petra’s interaction and, Schön claims, the growth of 
a convergence of meaning as a consequence of reflection. But, turning to Wittgen-
                                                 
21 Schön does not make any clear distinction between “behavior” and “action”. Everything 
tends to be deliberative action and be dependent on reflection. 
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stein, Newman emphasizes that “convergence of meaning does not and cannot 
emerge from reflection” (Newman, 1999, p 101). Quist and Petra do not become 
more “convergent” by reflecting on their behavior, they become more and more 
convergent by speaking to each other and by solving authentic problems together. 
The convergence in behavior and language is not an indication of convergence of 
meaning reached by their individual reflection. It is the convergence. Or, as Ryle 
dynamically writes: ”overt intelligent performances are not the clues to the work-
ings of minds; they are those workings” (Ryle, 1949, p 58). 
 
I agree with Newman’s criticism for the most part. He identifies some questionable 
theoretical claims in Schön’s reasoning (Newman, 1999; Schön, 1983, 1986). How-
ever, there is a vital issue that he does not analyze, namely the question whether 
“control” which is “produced” from “internal clues” (Schön’s terminology [Schön, 
1987, p 108]) necessarily implies “private language” or not. Newman argues that it 
does. Most likely he is right. In the scenario with the mother and the baby, the 
baby, Schön claims, “produces control” from “internal clues of feeling”. To be able 
to execute this kind of “internal” intelligent control, the baby seems to need some 
kind of pre-verbal conceptual-communicative system, a pre-language language.  
 
However, even if Newman is wrong, even if it is not the case that the “control” pro-
duced from “internal clues” necessarily implies the existence of a “private lan-
guage”, he has clearly pointed out the existence of what I have labeled a control–
matrix in Schön’s reasoning, even though, Newman does not explore it or recog-
nize it fully. This control-matrix states that something internal (a mind at work) 
controls the external (body) and this is where the discussions in my articles start. 
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OUTLINING THE ARTICLES 
 
My contributions take a different turn from Newman’s. The issue of control is for 
Newman a point where Schön’s reasoning is contradicted by Wittgenstein’s pri-
vate-language discussion, and since Wittgenstein is right (according to Newman) 
Schön is wrong. For Newman this is a matter of language-thinking. However, even 
if I believe that Newman has found an important weakness in Schön’s reasoning, I 
reframe this problem in the continuing part of my thesis and use different re-
sources than Newman does. This does not mean that I do not recognize Wittgen-
stein’s argumentation, but that the problem(s) that I am committed to can be taken 
further by the use of other theoretical resources. I use the concept of the control-
matrix that I have detected/constructed by analyzing Newman’s Wittgenstein-
influenced analyses of Schön and by applying it to the complex body-mind rela-
tionship. 
 
 
Imaginary Minds – Articles 1 & 2 
 
The first article is entitled “Giving up the Ghost: the Control-Matrix and Reflection-
in-action” (Erlandson, 2006). In this I discuss the relation between the body and 
thinking in Schön’s theory on “reflection-in-action”. I take my departure in the con-
trol-matrix elaborated above using concepts from Merleau-Ponty (1962). I argue 
that the control-matrix is a fundamental problem in Schön’s discussion about the 
concept of reflection-in-action; a problem that makes understanding (an explain-
ing of) human practice not only virtually impossible (and/or absurd) but also 
counter-productive.  
 
In The Reflective Practitioner (1983) Schön describes how Quist, the architect 
teacher is able to solve problems thanks to his reflection-in-action, while Petra, 
through her lack of reflection-in-action, fails to solve the same problems properly 
(Schön, 1983, p 102-104). After describing Quist’s behavior in the architect’s-studio 
Schön subsequently sums it up: ”But Quist reflects very little on his own reflection-
42
D o c i l e  B o d i e s  a n d  I m a g i n a r y  M i n d s  
 
 
in-action, and it would be easy for a student or observer to miss the fundamental 
structure of inquiry which underlies his virtuoso performance ” (Schön, 1983, p 
104).  
 
Schön, then, acknowledges that Quist’s performance as an architect virtuoso is the 
result of some kind of thinking. I argue that this is not the case. Instead, during his 
practice Quist gets involved in architectural work, and he uses the artifacts of the 
studio as he uses his body, without “thinking”. He reflects (as an architect) only 
when he confronts something that he usually does not meet with, and when he 
therefore has to take a “roundabout way” to frame the problem properly. This is 
why Quist is more efficient and effortless in the architect studio than Petra: he does 
not think more or better than Petra, he often does not have to “think” at all. On the 
other hand, Petra is not fully comfortable with the artifacts of the practice and 
therefore has to think. She has to take a roundabout way (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, pp 
147-148) to accomplish the same tasks.  
 
It is quite easy to find support for the claim of the “roundabout way” in everyday 
life. In “normal” cases, we do ordinary things without focusing our thoughts on 
them: like driving a car or brushing our teeth or visiting the supermarket. At the 
supermarket we just grab the groceries, enter the queue, pay and leave. It is for the 
novice that problem arise, forcing her to think. In this article I therefore claim that 
(i) with his concept of reflection-in-action Schön establishes a thinking “entity” that 
is unnecessary for the explanation of practitioners’ practice, (ii) the concept does 
not have epistemological validity (iii) the concept is counter-productive for analyz-
ing and describing action. 
 
On the other hand, although the control-matrix is evoked and reused by Schön, this 
problem is not of his own making. It genealogy could be traced back to ancient 
Greece, as pointed out by for instance Rorty (1980). In Plato’s cave-analogy, for 
example, the shadows are the mirage of the perception of the flesh that is to be re-
placed by the inner vision of ideas (1997). The categories that in the west we use in 
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everyday language to describe human action as “thinking” and “body” have since 
then been dichotomized. 
 
This dichotomization is also fundamental for Descartes who brings the radical 
doubt to an end and exclaims, “Cogito ergo sum”. He cannot doubt that he is think-
ing since the doubt about this is itself thinking. But, he can doubt the existence of 
the body. Descartes refines Plato’s order and attributes an existence to the soul 
separated from the body: res cogitans and res extensa:22 the “thinking thing” and 
the “extended thing”. The problems with this distinction and its reification of both 
body and soul are well known. But, as has been pointed out by different philoso-
phers from different traditions of reasoning – like Merleau-Ponty, Dewey and Ryle 
- Cartesianism is still an “official doctrine” (Ryle, 1949). And the Cartesian para-
digms have continued to haunt theories in social sciences and education (Säljö, 
2002; Erlandson, 2006). This also happens in Schön’s theories. The control-matrix 
in Schön’s reasoning (and the mind evoked by it) is therefore not something new. 
Schön only redistributes the problem in a new way by moving the thinking into 
actual doing.  
 
The control-matrix is, however, not only a problem in Schön’s reasoning, but also 
in the reflection discussion in a broader perspective, which I discuss in article 2, 
“Saving Dewey”. Here I develop the perspectives that I introduced in the previous 
article. I argue that Cartesian ontology is a structuring resource in some of the 
mainstream discussions in the reflection debate in education. The focus of the arti-
cle, however, is Dewey. I argue that Dewey has been dragged from his theoretical 
framework of pragmatism and been used as a representative of Cartesian ontology.  
                                                 
22 He also changes this order. Descartes’ fundamental question concerned the possibility of 
true knowledge (“true” as in self-evident). The ontological distinction between the soul and 
the body was a consequence of (epistemological) rationalistic doubt. This was not the case in 
Plato’s reasoning. 
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I point out that for Dewey reflection is a certain thinking technique, where cultural 
tools are at work when the subject tries to solve a problem that is an obstacle for 
action. But, in the reflection debate in education, there has been a tendency to at-
tach Dewey to a different framework. The example I take to illustrate this is Boud et 
al.’s influential Reflection: Turning Experience into Learning (1985).23  
 
The lines of argument that I use to demonstrate that Boud et al.’s reasoning is 
elaborated from a fundamentally different theoretical position than Dewey’s follow 
two main lines of reasoning. First, I discuss what Boud et al. write about “emo-
tions” and reflection in relation to Dewey. Secondly, I discuss what could be called 
the problem of discrete entities and metaphors. I argue that a Cartesian ontogene-
sis is generated and upheld by Boud et al.’s recognition of reflection. I claim that 
within the reflection debate Dewey has been used to support reasoning that repre-
sents the opposite of his own reasoning. 
 
 
Docile Bodies – Articles 3 & 4 
 
So far, I have discussed the control problem involved in Schön’s reasoning as an 
ontological and epistemological problem. The critique I have delivered has been 
aimed at the troublesome body-mind distinction, which ends up in a hypostasis of 
thinking and a reification of the body. I have used a line of reasoning from Mer-
leau-Ponty and with my critique I have tried, figuratively speaking, to move the 
thinking back into the body. However, even if that Merleau-Ponty delivers a satisfy-
ing suggestion in his treatment of the mind-body problem, it is still a discussion of 
the ontology of the body and consequently also of thinking and behavior. Merleau-
Ponty’s “body” is not a subject in a political field. No social forces demand political 
obedience or work from this ontological body.  
                                                 
23 The book is an anthology. The claims Boud et al. make here have become central in educa-
tion. They are good examples of the kind of claims that have become attached to the concept 
of reflection in the practice-oriented discussion and illustrate what has happened to the 
concept of reflection when appropriated out of Dewey’s pragmatic framework. 
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Problems of education are, however, found in networks of power, interaction and 
politics. They are integrated in social history, in issues concerning the use of arti-
facts - of language as well as buildings. As I pointed out previously, discussions of 
ontology and epistemology have their limitations. This is also a fundamental point 
made by Foucault. In Discipline and Punish (1991) he argues that except for studies 
of the body as a seat of “needs and appetites” and of the importance of “biological 
events” in the social sciences, the politics of the body also needs to be studied (Fou-
cault, 1991, pp 25-26). From this point of view, reflection needs to be reconsidered, 
not as a question of whether the theories on reflection (reflection-in-action) are 
right or not, ontologically or epistemologically, but in terms of what they do as a 
technology for subjectivation. By following these lines of reasoning I try to put the 
thinking body back into social practice. 
 
In article 3 “The Body Disciplined: Rewriting Teaching Competence and the Doc-
trine of Reflection” I argue that Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action is a theoreti-
cal construction that snatches the interacting, working, and producing bodies from 
their practices. Matters of politics, of institutional interaction and of the workings 
of social categories are reduced to matters of thinking.  
 
At the center of my discussion in this article, and in a way also in article 4, is Fou-
cault’s concept of power and what I have labeled the ”logic of panopticon.” Fou-
cault’s concept of power has been tremendously influential, and the discussions 
that it is involved in are complex. At least two characteristics should be mentioned 
as a broad and preliminary introduction: (i) Foucault’s power concept in Discipline 
and Punish contradicts the (enlightenment) tradition that separates power from 
knowledge. He argues that issues of power and knowledge are interwoven in social 
practices and in the institutional artifact use (linguistic, “physical” and architec-
tonical) that withholds and develops these practices. (ii) Foucault’s power concept 
contradicts the same traditions’ claim that schooling makes the individual free. 
Instead, it recognizes institutional power as subject-construction technologies that 
produce efficient bodies that act according to the demands and possibilities pre-
46
D o c i l e  B o d i e s  a n d  I m a g i n a r y  M i n d s  
 
 
sented as resources by that power. Foucault’s concept describes a social technique 
of making bodies useful and at the same time obedient. 
 
Discipline is, Foucault claims, one of the dominating workings of power in the 
growth of modern Western society. In Discipline and Punish he uses Panopticon, 
Bentham’s architectonical vision of prison to illustrate discipline as a subject-
construction technique. In Panopticon the captive is always visible and the guard-
ian never. This means that from the captive’s perspective there is always the possi-
bility that she is being observed, and she therefore never actually has to be under 
surveillance, the possibility of it is enough. Foucault’s panoptical logic could be syn-
thesized as proposing that subjects use available resources and therefore, presented 
by powerful institutional tools, the outcome of the subjects’ individuality - as a mat-
ter of self-production through interaction - is the consequence of participation 
(willingly or un-willingly) in institutional affairs.  
 
From the perspective of Foucault, I re-interpret Schön’s reflection in action. I argue 
that Schön’s description of the situation in the architects’ studio where Quist’s be-
havior is explained by a fundamental structure of inquiry that underlies his virtu-
oso performances (Schön, 1983, p 104) is not acceptable from Foucault’s perspec-
tive (1991), since matters of the political, social and cultural body are reduced to 
matters of “thinking”. From the perspective developed in Discipline and Punish the 
production of knowledgeable students and efficient teachers are mechanisms in the 
technique of making bodies more competent and simultaneously more docile. Fol-
lowing the same logic I also argue that if teachers use the tools offered by academic 
discourses to reinterpret their own situated actions in terms of reflection, they are 
making themselves accessible to the power-knowledge axis of educational scientific 
reasoning. This might mean that the teacher becomes more efficient (and therefore 
more beneficial in terms of economy), but also that she becomes less powerful (in 
political terms).  
 
In article four, “The Battle of Light”, I recognize the discourse of light and visuality 
as well as its antagonists. I focus on Schön’s reflection project and on Foucault’s 
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panoptical logic as discursive events and their legitimating functions. I take my 
point of departure in Rorty who argues that seeing has been the model for the 
dominant epistemological traditions in the West (Rorty, 1979), in particular in phi-
losophy, which is interwoven with and structured by visuality conceptualizations 
originating in Greece. This matrices of visuality and light also indicates a hierarchy 
of different forms of knowledge, Rorty claims, and thereby points to the legitimiz-
ing metaphysics for the “classical epistemology” (Taylor, 1991) in the West. It is not 
just a question of the ideal form of knowledge being conceptualized by matrices of 
visuality and light, but the knowledge of “the inner eye” being superior to other 
forms of knowledge.  
 
In The Reflective Practitioner Schön makes a similar point. He recognizes here the 
misconception of practice-oriented professions, such as the ones of architects or 
psychotherapists, as being inferior to those of medicine and engineering since it is 
hard to apply technical rationality to the work of architects and psychotherapists 
work. But, at the same time Schön uses “reflection” to describe the competence of 
these practitioners, and since reflection is involved in the conceptual matrices of 
visuality and light and thereby could be recognized as belonging to “the same side” 
as the knowledge of the “inner eye, in “reflection” the eye of the mind and the eye of 
the body are united. This, however, also opens up for the critique presented by 
post-colonialists (Said, 1981; Bhadha, 1994; Kannepalli Kanth, 1997) and post-
structuralists (Barthes, 1972, 1974; Derrida, 1978; 1997).  
 
I partly reuse my critique in article 3 but develop it following some of the lines of 
reasoning used in the “governmentality” discussion in education, which is indebted 
to Foucault’s lectures on governmentality at Collége de France (Burchell, 1991; 
Lemke, 2000). In these lectures Foucault recognizes a link between techniques of 
the self and techniques of domination. This link is acknowledged by the concept of 
governmentality that is a set of techniques for making people conduct themselves 
in certain ways. I point out that the critique on the light and visuality theme that 
Foucault synthesized in panopticon as an axis of power-knowledge aimed at the 
active body, in the discussion about governmentality is developed further (Lemke, 
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2001; Peters 2004, 2005; Olsson, 2004). Instead of constructing a guard-guarded 
relation, the visuality idiom in this discussion recognizes a link where an individual 
is at the same time guard and guarded through a two-way visuality.  
 
I do not believe that participation in these citizen-consumer producing discourses 
was Schön’s original intention. On the contrary, Schön entered, or actually contrib-
uted to initiating, a discussion of practitioner’s knowledge and thinking. But by 
reusing reflection and thereby the matrices of light and visuality, his theories were 
usable in the social production of a certain kind of subjectivity.  
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WHAT ABOUT REFLECTION? 
 
The two main questions that structure the analytical efforts in the articles, as well 
as in the thesis as a whole, are: (i) is Schön’s suggestion about the value of “reflec-
tion-in-action” valid as an epistemological suggestion for describing and analyzing 
the content and quality of teacher practice, (ii) how can Schön’s concept of reflec-
tion-in-action and its use in education be conceived as matters of discourse? I have 
argued (i) that the epistemological claims in Schön’s theory on reflection-in-action 
are highly problematic (ii) that the theory of the reflective practitioner is to be rec-
ognized as a concept that is interwoven in a particular historical and political tech-
nique for the construction of subjectivity. Both points, however, deserve to be 
somewhat elaborated on before turning to the articles proper. 
 
 
Reflection and Control 
 
If reflection-in-action involves considerable problems as an epistemological sug-
gestion about professional practice, where does Schön take the wrong path? Given 
the analysis in this thesis, one fundamental mistake Schön makes is that he reuses 
a Cartesian control-matrix when explaining the successive schooling of practitio-
ners. For instance, the architect behavior Quist has acquired by participating in the 
linguistic and bodily activities within the framework of architect practice is in 
Schön’s reasoning described as the result of conscious actions effectuated by an 
“underlying” thinking (Schön, 1983, p 104).  
 
On the other hand, the concept of reflection-in-action answers to a particular de-
mand, given Schön’s discussions and theoretical framework. The “grace” that Quist 
shows in the architect-studio in comparison with Petra, needs a plausible interpre-
tation, and since Schön does not elaborate the body as a thematic field but uses a 
Cartesian body, where body is recognized as an physical object, interpretations that 
acknowledge a skillful body are not available to him. As a consequence there is a 
need for a concept that can explain how the body can behave as it does, i.e. how it 
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seems to be able to be trained to a point where, with only minimal effort, it is able 
to navigate between different complex activities exemplified in the architect prac-
tice or teacher practice. Reflection-in-action is therefore a “bridge-concept” that has 
emerged in the gap between the Cartesian reified body and the Cartesian reified 
mind.  
 
One aspect of Schön’s reasoning that may have contributed to it taking a wrong 
direction is that while human activity has a tendency to be explained in terms of 
thinking (reflection), thinking (reflection) has a tendency to be reduced to “prob-
lem solving”. In The Reflective Practitioner Quist does not participate in practices 
involving social interactions such as chatting about yesterday’s weather, or football 
matches, because these uphold other functions than problem solving. In Schön’s 
text Quist is focused on solving architectonical problems and his activities are de-
scribed in terms of how these contribute to solving problems.  
 
Schön’s position is of course quite understandable given the framework and pur-
pose of Schön’s text. However, the emphasis on problem solving, becomes not only 
a consequence of the purpose of the text, but also an paradigm for discussions of 
human thinking (and action) in general. This is apparent in the example with the 
mother that communicates with the baby. From Schön’s perspective, it seems rea-
sonable to frame this situation as the baby having a problem to solve in order to be 
able to communicate with her mother. From the same perspective it also seems 
adequate, therefore, to introduce reflection-in-action as a concept to facilitate the 
interpretation of how this problem-solving activity is possible. But, from other 
theoretical frameworks it may appear strange to recognize the communication be-
tween the mother and the baby as having something to do with problem solving at 
all.  
 
The over-emphasis on problem solving is a special outcome of the over-emphasis 
on thinking that, as pointed out before, is a consequence of the workings of Carte-
sian matrices and especially what I have called “the control-matrix” in this thesis. 
The physical body is not a direct agent involved in action but an obedient and me-
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diating tool for the controlling, learning and reflecting mind. Therefore, an inter-
pretation of a situation that points to an existential and social-culturally situated 
body’s reciprocal answer to the demands and possibilities of that situation (as in 
the case with the mother and the baby) is not available for Schön.  
 
 
Reflection as Discursive Event 
 
In the early 80s Boud et al., after visiting a conference in Australia, Reflection: Turn-
ing experience in to learning, (1985) in an attempt to use a new/reinvented reflection 
concept, inherited form Dewey and Aristotle. Their aim was to contribute to 
strengthening the field of teacher-research. The concept of reflection appeared to 
be a conceptual tool by which it seemed possible to discussing and acknowledging 
teachers thinking, their classroom work, and their professionalism. Some years 
earlier Schön had published The Reflective Practitioner (1983), trying to reframe 
the problem of how to acknowledge the undoubted skillfulness of professional 
practitioners, something that epistemological theories and frameworks of ”techni-
cal rationality” had not been able too. The discussions emerging from publications 
like these, called for a comment by Zeichner & Tabachinick 1991, who pointed out 
that it is almost impossible to find a teacher-trainer who does not emphasize the 
importance of reflection. 
 
Schön’s book on the reflective practitioner, contributed to elaborating a theme that 
would inspire countless discussions in education. Reflection-in-action - synthesiz-
ing the idea of professional action being obtained by a special kind of thinking - 
appealed to the world of education and became a catalyzing concept in emerging 
research on teaching. In this thesis I discuss some arguably important problems 
with Schön’s concept. 
 
Does the reasoning in this thesis mean that we should not use the term “reflec-
tion”? As I have indicated already the metaphors/metaphysics at work in reasoning 
structured by and around “reflection” are, as in the case with “mind”, part of a 
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Western heritage that is not easily dispensed with. Yet the term remains somewhat 
misleading in explaining and interpreting human action.  
 
Even if one wants to argue that the everyday use of a concept contributes to regen-
erating it, and therefore should be avoided, for the time being, we (in the West) are 
as stuck with “reflection” as we are with “mind”. However, I suggest caution when 
it comes to using the concept of reflection when developing scientific reasoning 
and/or scientific models in education. Reflection seems to be a “blanket-concept” 
that tends to as, Newman puts it, cover problems rather than solve them (Newman, 
1999). In addition, as this thesis argues, reflection-in-action is counter-productive 
when it comes to describing, analyzing and evaluating human action and the social 
practices that this action is embedded in and framed by.  
 
Although, “reflection-in-action” is a highly problematic concept when it comes to 
analyzing, describing and developing practitioners’ practices, the impact of this 
concept has been tremendous. From the perspectives presented in this thesis the 
impact was perhaps not only due to the fact that the growing field of research on 
teaching needed theoretical tools as scientific resources in order to describe teach-
ing. The concept also became used as a political tool; a tool for empowerment, a 
tool for creating scientific concepts for teachers themselves in terms that the aca-
demic world would accept. Schön’s book The Reflective Practitioner (1983) fitted 
the political-strategic and institutional needs of teachers.  
 
Following Foucault (1991) one could argue that reflection as a discursive event is a 
question concerning how reflection is used as a resource for the creation of legiti-
matizing links between a profession and the academic description of the profes-
sion. Reflection is a way for teachers to gain access to an axis of power-knowing 
that structure the tools for increased knowing and at the same time increased docil-
ity. The university is from this perspective and from the perspectives of everyday 
activities of working teachers a somewhat hostile regime.  
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On the other hand, the theme of reflection, as elaborated on in Schön’s The Reflec-
tive Practitioner and disseminated over the world of education for twenty years, 
should not be recognized as an internal academic activity, or an activity that de-
scribes the relation between academic practices and practices outside the academic 
world. Neither should it be understood as a local, and in temporal terms, distinc-
tively limited discussion, for the cultural material that is in use in the reflection dis-
cussions in education, originated in ancient Greece (elaborated by Plato in The Re-
public [1997]) and has over the centuries been reused and transformed into differ-
ent conceptual, linguistic and discursive formations, both in explanations of activi-
ties or interpretation of them, as well as in legitimating those structuring efforts 
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Foucault, 1991; Kannepalli Kanth, 1997). In other words, 
imagined minds have been used on docile bodies in the production of subjectivity.  
 
To illustrate the point we could use Conrad’s novel Heart of Darkness (1989)24, in 
which the European carriers of light are an invasion-force of the West who exploit 
Africa, and who in the name of civilization, efficiency and commerce commit hide-
ous crimes. The matrices of light and visuality are involved in Conrad’s construc-
tion, and, as Rorty points out, these matrices acknowledge a divergence between 
different forms of knowledge. But they also represent a major characteristic of the 
epistemological tradition of the West, a tradition that also clusters activities, work 
and social practices (as well as the linguistic and conceptual organization of these 
matters) according to the same discursive “logics of equivalence” (Laclau & Mouffe, 
1985). The same hierarchy functions in putting light over darkness, theoretical rea-
son over practical reason, reason over emotion, man over woman and human over 
animal. This is why the practical matters that individuals are involved in could 
profit from being described in terms of light and visuality. “Epistemology” is at 
work.  
 
This idea of “epistemology at work” offer, I think, quite another perspective of the 
wide circulation of reflection in education and at the same time illustrates a Focaul-
tian power concept. The resources offered by reflection provide an increase in 
                                                 
24 originally published in 1899 
54
D o c i l e  B o d i e s  a n d  I m a g i n a r y  M i n d s  
 
 
knowledge and a new way to describe and legitimate teacher work. But at the same 
time they also offer an increased obedience, as this “new knowledge” and its legiti-
mating resources demand academic forms of understanding and recognition. An-
other side of the workings of these, with a Foucaultian vocabulary, “technologies” 
of visuality and light are exemplified in the landscapes of glass that are multiplying 
in the West, where the guardian-guarded prism of power accentuates the self-
regularity of the citizen-consumer. Reflection is another mechanism in this tech-
nology. 
 
In a way, Schön’s “thinking baby” is an appropriate idiomatic picture of the reflec-
tion theme brought to an intellectual as well as social end. The control inflated in 
the reciprocal process between the baby and the mother is a small interlude in 
Schön’s description, an exemplification of the workings of reflection-in-action. But, 
at the same time, it is also the marking of, and the opening into, a conceptual (and 
metaphysical) landscape. Rewritten, the thinking baby is the intellectual baby, no-
ticing its mother clapping hands, judging them, taking different possible responses 
into consideration and after a while, deciding to answer the same way by following 
the mother’s handclap rhythm. This points in a direction where it is possible to de-
scribe human activities, history, struggles, preferences and desires in intellectual 
terms in a way that at the same time fixates human beings as docile, effective, flexi-
ble, accountable, self-regulative and autonomous. Reflection(in-action) came to 
work in the production of subjects that are capable of economic rational choices in 
the penetrating light of reason. But in the same way as there are individuals who 
never learn to/are disciplined to do this well, the Western enlighten man is not the 
only possible ideal. There are of course other lines of argumentation, or other 
voices (Bachtin, 1986, 1993), that offer alternatives to these possibilities. 
 
There is, of course, no end to this discussion. Even if the reflection theme in educa-
tion works mainly socially and politically, some of the issues recognized in the de-
bates around reflection highlight authentic problems. These problems concern 
practitioner practices as well as the human capability to develop skills in relation to 
the environment as well as to critically discuss this environment. This is amply il-
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lustrated in the journal Reflective Practice that has been able to publish contribu-
tions that express not only Schön’s views but also conflicting ones. Discussions 
about the issues involved in the reflection debate are bound to continue, one way or 
another.  
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